

Uniate /vs./ Orthodox: What Lays behind the Conflict?
A conflict analysis

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The current paper investigates the Romanian Uniate/ Orthodox conflict from the perspective of peace and conflict studies, making use of an interpretation of Johan Galtung's conflict theory and his proposed analysis tools.[2] The aims are to contribute to a more comprehensive and multilateral understanding of this conflict in a wider context than the ideological one and hopefully to suggest some of the means of attenuating the conflict.

"[...] the solution to a contemporary problem will never be found in a problem raised in another era,

which is not the same problem except through a false resemblance." P. Veyne[1]

KEY WORDS

the Uniate-Orthodox conflict, Romanian Orthodox Church, Catholic Church, ideological conflict, identity

Introduction

The first part of the paper reviews the emergence and development of the Uniate/ Orthodox conflict, proposing four different phases with particular characteristics and arguing that the conflict was shaped and re-shaped throughout these stages from an ideological to an economic level. Ariadna's thred is the quest for power (understood in all its dimensions). The second part of the paper will address the methodological issues, defining the main concepts used and putting forward an analysis of the conflict in view of the proposed methodology. Finally, the conclusion will attempt to peer into possible futures, mapping alternatives for conflict transformation laying ahead.

1. Brief overview of the Uniate/Orthodox conflict

The Uniate/ Orthodox conflict will be looked upon as a process, with several phases and various levels of actors. The point of this overview is to show how this process was impacted and shaped at several significant junctures: 1918, 1945 and 1989. These three dates re-opened and re-defined the conflict, with its three components: attitudes and behaviors of the actors involved towards each other and contradictions born from the competing goals of the actors; put otherwise, they re-defined not only the agenda, but the actors themselves. Subsequently, the process gradually affected the context - the Orthodox Church and the Romanian state were forced into accepting and accommodating the Uniate Church. In the present phase, the conflict is no longer on ideological level, but on the economic level, namely resources. This opens opportunities for a positive conflict transformation - or not - the final decision resting upon the actors.

1.1. From 1698 to 1918: Conflict emergence

In 1698, the Eastern Catholic Church (the Uniate Church) was born, upon an offer made by the Habsburg emperor Leopold I to the Orthodox Church in the Habsburg territory, including Transylvania: accept the Papal supremacy, the unleavened Eucharist bread, the existence of purgatory and the filioque doctrine. In return, the clergy and laity will enjoy the same privileges as Catholics, along with an exemption for the clergy from labor services and other fiscal duties.[3]

For almost 300 years, Romanians in Transylvania under Habsburg rule were second class citizens. No wonder that Leopold's offer was considered as the appropriate pragmatic solution by a minority at that time (Orthodox Romanians) in order to coexist and prosper under particular circumstances. The result was the Uniate Church, consisting of the Metropolitan province of Alba-Iulia and Fagaras with the seat in Blaj and headed by one Archibishop, with dioceses in Oradea, Lugoj, Cluj and Baia Mare and with around 200,000 believers.[4] The Uniate Church preserved the main Ortho-

dox rite, but was placed under the Vatican's jurisdiction.[5]

This phase may be seen as the non-violent emergence, delimitation and definition of the initial conflict, which opposed the Romanian Orthodox Church, on one side, to the Catholic Church and the Habsburg Empire on the other. Not surprisingly, the Romanian Orthodox Church did not happily accept this act. In fact, it never ceased to regard this conversion as a "betrayal", accusing that its members were lured by the Catholics, in a political stratagem, and the Uniates were rather perceived as the "*victim*" and were expected to rejoin the Orthodox rite as soon as this would be possible.

1.2. From 1918 to 1945: Re-shaping the conflict

Once Transylvania became part of Romania (1918), it seemed that the opportunity for rejoining was finally there. However, the Uniate Church had by than one and a half million believers, and was the wellspring of a dynamic intelligentsia, deeply involved in the creation of Romanian nationhood: politicians like Iuliu Maniu, scholars like G. Sincai, Petru Maior or Innochetie Micu Clain. Concerned with the preservation of the Latin roots of the Romanian people, the intellectual uniates (known as the Transylvanian School) "decisively influenced the generation of 1848 revolutionaries who struggled to establish an independent Romanian nation-state. Building on the recorded social memories and consciously constructed images of the early nineteenth century intellectuals, these revolutionaries produced their own official social memories and images to define a modern national identity that 'required' statehood."[6]

These tight links between Romanian nation-hood creation and the Uniate Church legitimized the latter within Romanian nationalist ideology[7] and subsequently forced its acceptance as a separate entity by the Orthodox Church. Even more, as the ruling dynasty of the Hohenzollern was Catholic by birth (changing religion only due to political reasons), by 1926 the Uniate leaders were granted a position in the Romanian parliament, thus challenging the dominant traditional role of the Orthodox bishops over the ruling elite.[8] The increasing Catholic political influence came to an end under Antonescu's government, when Orthodoxy became the means of mass manipulation (Orthodox values were used to mask the extreme nationalist and chauvinistic policy of the Iron Guard) and subsequently equated to being a "*true Romanian*".

With the acceptance of the Uniate Church as a legitimized, independent actor, the Orthodox Church was no longer in conflict with the Catholic Church (within this particular context), nor with another state, but with a former insider who became an outcast. The ideological threat was therefore even greater, as the doctrines of the two rites were not that different. This could have not only confused the believers, who would not be able to see the reason for distinguishing so sharply between the two Churches (the threat of perceiving the Uniate as 'brothers' or 'siblings'), but it

could have raised doubts on the centrality of Orthodoxy within the definition of the Romanian identity. By losing its centrality, the Orthodox Church would also lose its political influence and monopoly over religion (with everything deriving from lose of the status of 'national church'). Thus the conflict was in itself altered: the fight was no longer to bring back the lost flock, but rather to keep the flocks apart in order to prevent any claim over power and resources.

1.3. From 1945 to 1989: A Latent Phase?

After the second world war, under Soviet influence, the Church as an institution was secularized and put under the direct control of the State.[9] Due to the "[...] Byzantine legacy of a 'symphony' between secular and spiritual powers [...]"[10] the Orthodox Church adhered to the policy of the new communist government and was granted a special position.[11] Feeling more secure, the Orthodox Patriarch made it clear that the Uniates are part of the Orthodox Church, putting assimilation on the Orthodox (and state) agenda, stating at his enthronement: "At this moment, our thoughts turn to our Greek Catholic brothers, who until 250 years ago, were part of our flock... In these conditions part of the Orthodox flock in Transylvania, threatened with death, joined the flock of the tyrannical wolves and they have not yet had the courage to return to the Mother Church [...] Be true Romanians, like your forefathers... return to the ancestral Church, the Church of your and our forefathers."[12]

With the Concordat abolished, the absorption process of the Uniates started in October 1948, when thirty-eight Uniate priests made a formal request to the Patriarch for rejoining the Orthodox Church. These priests were carefully selected by the government and, in spite of the protests of the Apostolic Nuncio and of some other Uniate bishops, the reunification proceeded. The assembly's decision was confirmed by the Government in December of that year. The reunification process was not as easy as it might have seemed and over six hundred churchmen were imprisoned.[13] However, once accomplished some of the Uniate properties were nationalised and some were transferred to the Orthodox Church. On their part, the Uniate clergy and believers "conformed on the tacit understanding that, if given a chance, they would revert to Rome."[14] and functioned unofficially, holding underground meetings, secretly appointing bishops and preserving its believers.

In spite of the meetings between Romanian Orthodox bishops and Ceausescu with the Pope in the '70s, the Uniate problem remained unresolved. Both Orthodox Church and the state saw the matter as closed - legally and ideologically, solved through the reconversion. However, failing to acknowledge that the contradiction still existed did not mean that the conflict was over once and for all. This phase of denying the conflict by imposing an authoritarian solution was in-

deed violent and aggravated the attitudes of the actor whose mere existence was denied.

1.4. From 1989 onwards: Control over resources.

With the demise of communism, the Uniate Church self-restored on the very last day of 1989 (recognized by the government in April 1990) and reclaimed its nationalized properties, as well as those transferred in 1948 to the Orthodox Church. At this point in time, religious freedom has been restored and secured in the legal framework; but at the same time, the Orthodox Church preserved its role as the "National Church of Romania" and openly reclaimed its centrality in the definition of Romanian identity. It was hard to deny the Uniate their right to existence, but at the same time it was easy to influence the public agenda on behalf of the Orthodox Church.

As a result, after the euphoria of the first moments of liberty, when the Orthodox Church promised the return of Greek-Catholic properties,[15] attempts to solve the restoration problem failed. The Orthodox party had no interest in the dialogue, claiming legal ownership over the respective properties. On the other hand, Uniates lacked any documents for their request, as these were destroyed after 1948. In this vacuum favored by the weak legal system, rumors of "unpatriotic" conduct of the Uniate members (due to their affiliation with the Pope) fed the nationalistic feelings against the Greek-Catholics. The attacks of the Orthodox Church were on several occasions supported by the government to stir up nationalistic feelings against Hungarians in Transylvania (by suggesting that Romanians can only be Orthodox and Hungarians - Catholics, hence Uniate are serving Hungarian interests).


Several attempts to reconcile the two churches' claims over the same resources failed. A 1990 mixed joint commission set up by a governmental decree to investigate the disputed cases did not meet until 1998 and failed after five meetings in 1999. Because of this decree, courts may refuse to consider lawsuits on the claiming of property. A 1993 document signed between Orthodox and Uniate Churches regarding properties was rejected by the Romanian Greek Catholics. A 1995 meeting between the Orthodox Patriarch and the Uniates was doomed to failure because of the unfair discussion set up by the Patriarch.[16] In 1997, a proposal by a Christian Democrat senator on the restoration of Uniate properties in places where there still exist important Uniate communities was boycotted by the Orthodox community and did not materialize. A 1998 meeting between the two churches to reach a compromise failed once again.[17] The 1999 visit of the Pope to Romania was a widely covered event, however with no direct consequences on the Uniate – Orthodox conflict, except at the declarative level. In 2001, two Uniate parishes have sued the Romanian state to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

2. Conflict analysis

Building upon the conflict theory developed by Johan Galtung, one of the founders of modern peace studies, the current analysis seeks to apply an interpretation of the theoretical framework to a concrete situation. As with any analysis of the kind, the limitations reside in the human inability to take into account all aspects of the conflict, due mainly to its complexity.

2.1. Defining concepts

How is conflict defined in this paper? The protean nature of the concept infringes upon the development of a widely accepted definition, though some common elements enable understanding and mutual completition between the various schools of thought. On the same line with Galtung[18], this paper considers conflict as a *clash between incompatible, overlapping goals*, constructed in a triadic manner within a *temporal dimension* and summing up the *attitudes/ assumptions, the behaviors,* and *the contradictions* involved. (Figure 1) The three corners of the conflict triangle are in correlation, reinforcing and completing each other.



Defining conflict is a tricky task in itself, as the word bares negative connotations from its daily overuse, especially in the media. Current research see conflict as an inherent element of human development[19], one of the elements that induce transformation, as during the process, change comes about. From this perspective, conflict may be the opportunity for a positive change or transformation to occur.[20] Not being good or bad *per se*, but rather becoming negative or positive through how it is handled by the participants, conflict is formed around a contradiction, involving different views, feelings and targets. Thus, rather than seeing conflict as a monolithic construct, this paper considers it as constantly changing - a process - re-defining the actors and contradictions involved. (Table 1)

Though conflicts may arise within one individual or between two or more individuals, the present paper will consider conflict on the collective level - conflict between communities. A community is here defined as a group of people sharing some common collective values, rules and purposes, as well as a sense of belonging to that particular group. Communities might behave/ act homogeneously without this implying that they are indeed perfectly homogeneous. But at the same time, communities might be split and act heterogeneously, without this implying that there is no longer a community. Analysis should therefore pay particular attention to communities as a whole and at the same time as potentially factional.

Table 1. Mapping the process of the Uniate/ Orthodox conflict

Period	Contradictions	Main Actors	Characteristics of the phase
1689 - 1918 **Emergence phase**	Overlapping goals over the same believers	Orthodox Church// Catholic Church// Habsburg Empire	Emergence of the conflict Development as an intra-confessional, ideological conflict
1918 - 1945 **Re-shaping the conflict**	Denying identity of one of the actors. Overlapping goals over the same believers Overlapping goals over access to and control of power (political, economic)	Orthodox Church// Uniate Church// Romanian nation-state// Ruling dynasty// Catholic Church	Re-defining the contradiction, the actors and the conflict Conflict remains largely intra-confessional, ideological but gains a power dimension (political, economic)
1945 - 1989 **Violent absorption**	As one of the actors is forcefully removed, the contradiction is erased under an authoritarian decision. The contradiction however exists on a hidden level- overlapping goals over the existence/ non-existence of an actor.	Orthodox Church// Romanian State (Ruling Elite)// Uniate Church	Re-defining the actors - one actor is forcefully assimilated. Conflict moves towards recognition/ survival of the existence and identity. Structural violence
1989 - onwards **Control over resources**	Overlapping goals over resources (property)	Orthodox Church// Uniate Church// Romanian State// International actors (COE, ECHR)// Power elites// Mass media// Local actors	The actors and the context are re-defined. Conflict moves towards economic goals - maximization of access to resources. Tension in some local communities

Conflict on this level automatically involves more than two actors, because local communities are integrated within a broader society and interconnected through various channels.[21] Local communities might however share in common certain similarities/ features, like religion or ethnicity for instance. Thus the identity may be local and also on a larger scale, with individuals/ communities remote geographically, yet having something in common. Minorities are hence defined here as a group of people sharing certain features — features that are essential to building the collective identity, as well as a feeling of appurtenance to that specific group, and whose access to power and self-governance is conditioned by another group.

Last, but not least, individuals have multiple identities and appurtenances that cross ethnic, religious and cultural boundaries.[22] However, as the complexity of a conflict increases proportionally with the number of the actors involved - thus turning its analysis into an almost impossible task - it becomes necessary that a certain degree of generalization occurs (and this is how Table 1 should be read).

If conflict is defined as having a temporal dimension, this implies at least a beginning - the formation of the conflict - and a transformation. What about a solution? A beginning implies an end, a solution - but is that really the case? Can a conflict between two communities have a solution that would not only resolve the contradiction, but also annul the attitudes and the behavior in the long term for all the actors involved, on both collective and individual levels? As the attempt to impose a solution through authoritarian means in phase 3 shows in the current case study, solutions are not final unless - according to Galtung - they are "(1) acceptable to all actors, (2) sustainable by the actors"[23] (actors being interpreted here as communities - leaderships and individuals).

Considering that the dichotomy beginning/end, problem/solution instead of helping the overcoming of the conflict, rather fixes the conflict upon itself, thus prohibiting positive progress, the present paper looks at conflict as a transformation processes, where changes are happening at all times shaping both the conflict and the involved actors. Instead of solutions, this perspective proposes that positive handling of conflicts should be viewed as tools that help the actors overcome the disagreement, the attitudes and the behavior associated with conflict. "*But basically, conflict transformation is a never-ending process.* Old or new contradictions open up. Negative, or hopefully positive, conflict energy of the A [attitudes] and B [behavior] varieties is continually injected into the formation. A solution, in the sense of a steady-state durable formation is at best a temporary goal. A far more significant goal is *transformative capacity*, the ability to handle transformations in an acceptable and sustainable way."[24]

2.2. Analysis

Based on the above-described concepts, the conceptual analysis starts from investigating the potential

number of actors and hypothesizing their presumed interests in the conflict during the fourth phase - since 1989 to today. The methodology contains an analysis of attitudes, beliefs and contradictions for each of the main actors. As the conflict (and the actors) are not in a vacuum, there is a need for taking into consideration the structural and cultural implications and limitations that affect the conflict.[25]

Table 2 describes the main actors involved in the present phase of the conflict and attempts to map their potential interests (as inferred from their actions). It also takes into consideration the structural constraints, namely the inherent features of the structure (be it local community, state or international system – in terms of institutional and cultural constraints) that may exert pressure and thus re-shape the conflict. The table however should not be interpreted as a homogenization of actors: within all actors there have been individuals that have expressed different attitudes and behaved differently from their group (for instance, the case of the Metropolitan Bishop of Timisoara, Nicolae Corneanu who, opposing the Orthodox Church's hierarchy, gave back - or at least supported the liturgy by providing worship places - some of the properties to the Uniate Church, among which is the Cathedral in Lugoj).

Table 3 makes use of the triadic nature of the conflict (see figure 1 above) to analyze the attitudes, behaviors and the disagreement for each of the main identified actors. While asserting the attitudes/ assumptions and behaviors of others is always a matter of subjectivity, some general patterns can be inferred from the explicit actions of the actors. The analysis in Table 3 is based on subjective inferences from the observation of the actions of the actors involved. It is an interpretation of the main actors and their acts in connection to the conflict.

Instead of conclusion: Paths laying ahead.

Transcending the ideological level may open new opportunities for a "detensioning" of the Uniate/ Orthodox relations and enforcement of religious minorities rights. But the transformation of the conflict from around one concerning an ideological disagreement to an economic disagreement (overlapping claims over property) does not imply that the ideological rhethorics is not present on the level of attitudes and behavior. However, ideology does not constitute the core of the conflict anymore.

So where can the conflict go from here? If conflict is seen as a transformative process, than what are the main factors able to influence its transformation towards a positive outcome? Coming back to figure 1, if conflict is to be seen as the inter-linkage of attitudes/ assumptions, behaviors and contradiction, than pressing upon either one or all of the corners can lead to a reshaping of the conflict.

A first possible path would be when attitudes and behavior remin the same, while the contradiction is not resolved. In the absence of any progress or any (at least

Table 2

Main actors	Assumed Interests	Structural constraints
Uniate Church ***Clergy*** ***Believers***	Property back (having worship places means the believers will come to exercise their faith under Uniate Church rite and subsequently, according to the legislative framework, the Church will be entitled to higher state subsidies). Exercise believe. Maybe even expand community of believers (this would bring a higher income) Influence/ power on local community leaders.	Orthodox tradition - embedded in the Romanian national identity, affecting not only the values of the communities, but the values of the political elites. Nationalist ideology - played upon by all actors of the political stage - builds upon the Orthodox values of being Romanian. A long tradition of interference of the Orthodox Church into the state affairs (political power). Legal framework on national level (state - government interference in the establishment and functioning of the Churches, state subsidies for recognized Churches proportional to the number of their believers, no proper legal framework for the restitution of religious or communal property). A minority rights framework (either on state or international level), including supremacy of the decisions of the European Court for Human Rights.
Orthodox Church ***Clergy*** ***Believers***	Preserve ownership over properties. Preserver flock of people coming to exercise their faith in the Orthodox Churches - State subsidies. Absorb Uniate flock. Preserve and increase political power (on local and national level).	Legal system national and international (some Uniate properties were won in court - which forced the Orthodox Church to give them back. Still, on local levels, Orthodox communities may refuse to do this and delay the process, e.g. blocking the properties). State and Church separation. State subsidizes the Church -> state control over the Church.
Romanian state (ruling elites, state bureaucracy)	Support Orthodox Church (as spiritual source of Romanian hood). The Constitution legitimizes the Orthodox Church as the Romanian National Church. Win elections --> win votes. In compact Uniate communities, political actors may change their behavior and promise support. But at the same time, they could play upon nationalistic feelings by equating Uniate with Hungarians and scapegoating them within ethnic Romanian communities. Put forward a kind of public political performance that would legitimize them as "democratic" for the international and internal audience.	National and international legislative framework. Political system is embedded into nationalist ideology (building upon Romanian identity as essentially Orthodox). Believers (Uniate or Orthodox) are in the end voters - at election times, they will cast the vote and elect the ruling elites to be in power. In more or less religiously homogeneous communities, religion may be an important factor to win the votes.

Justice system	The access of Uniates to fill in complaints within the Justice system is denied. Avoid/ refuse cases of Uniate.	National and international legislative framework. There is a traditional interference of the political (executive) in the justice system.
Vatican (Catholic Church)	Preserve a Uniate Church in Romania by restoration of properties -> a richer Uniate Church is also more powerful in the community. Potential expansion of parishes once faith can be exercised.	International framework for minority rights (religious minorities). Romanian national legislative framework (religious life is under the state control). Relations with the Romanian state (diplomacy) - to what extent can the Vatican exert political influence/ pressures and through what means?
NGOs	Ensure (religious) minority rights.	National and international legislation. Culturally, a weak civic movement and participation. International networks of NGOs and relation with supranational institutions, such as COE and ECHR.
Mainstream mass media	Get audience (plays upon sensational and conflictual to sell its product). Some actors take upon themselves the tasks of "crusading" for Orthodoxy (as an inherent feature of Romanian identity).	Regulative framework (provisions against libel, calumny, insult). Self-regulation of the media industry in order to abide by some professional standards (weak in Romania). Media industry is embedded within the cultural framework (affected by the values of Romanian national identity). Political and economic pressures and inferences in the journalistic enterprise. The main function of the media is still perceived by the
Local actors (police, school, city hall etc.)	Interests on local level are the hardest to be generalized, as they involve several variables, including: degree of religious homogeneity of the community, religious appurtenance of some actors, nationalist position etc.	Romanian legal framework, providing for freedom of religion and minority rights. However, on local levels, cultural constraints are higher (especially rural communities are more traditional).
International community (supranational organizations: COE, ECHR)	Secure and implement freedom of religion. Observe the implementation of ECHR decisions	International legal framework on minority rights (including rights of religious minorities). Supremacy of ECHR decisions – need for the state to implement them. International network of NGOs concerned with the issue of freedom of faith, exerting pressures on the governments of states through supra-national institutions and media.

partial) agreement, the situation is prolonged in the hope that it will become the status quo. But this would only deepen the frustrations of the Uniate clergy and believers, which in the long run is neither beneficial, nor productive for any of the actors involved.

It may be that attitudes and behavior become more radical, and therefore no agreement can be reached on the contradiction. If the structure remains the same (meaning the legal framework, the behavior of the ruling elites and the refusal of the judiciary to deal with the problem), than it is more likely that the attitudes and behaviors of the two religious communities will be aggravated. Mutual negative feelings will feed hate speech and prejudices, which on their turn will increase the likelihood of a discriminating behavior. However, the pressures from the international organizations and NGOs may induce a positive structural change on the level of Romanian central state apparatus.

But change may come through yet another corner: behavior. Should behavior change - either by itself or under external pressures - the content of the disagreement can be approached with various alternative solutions. By finding a common ground for tackling the disagreement, attitudes will be increasingly altered (positively or negatively). If attitudes become more positive, than favourable conditions for a more comprehensive solution for the contradiction could be created.

Last, but not least, another approach could be conceived if the structure changes and the contradiction is addressed, namely the judiciary under the pressure of the international organizations (especially under the pressure to incorporate the EHCR decisions, but also under EU integration trends) starts dealing with the overlapping property claims. Such a change must be accompanied by finding a common ground between the two Churches in order to prevent the escalation of negative attitudes on one part or the other.

Of course, possible conflict transformations could be looked upon from yet another pespective: community and leadership levels. The influence of actors such as the mass media, NGOs, political elites - on both national and local levels - and local actors could provide the glue for a positive conflict transformation, or could deepen the crisis. Behavior could be addressed on the level of the local communities through a more creative approach, like for instance agreeing to use the same worship facilities for both confessions in places where there is only one church - and intuitively it might seem as easier to find a common ground and to start building in local communities; subsequently, the pressure from the bottom upwards could enforce a change in the behavior of the leadership of the two Churches. Political elites, the justice system and local actors have the power to address the legislative and the judicial aspects - creating favorable conditions for the positive transformation to occur by removing some of the structural constraints causing the imbalance between the two Churches.

Table 3: Analysis of the attitudes/ assumptions, behaviors and contradictions as inferred from the explicit actions of the actors.

Main actors	Attitudes/ Assumptions	Behaviors	Contradictions
Uniate Church *Clergy* *Believers*	Frustration caused by the impossibility of exercising belief. Frustrations caused by the lack of access to justice system. A distinct Uniate identity. Assumption that the Orthodox Church is "after" the Uniate, aiming to assimilate the believers and to deny Uniate identity. The Other: Orthodox Church (which is also a political actor) and Romanian state.	Bring claims to courts on national and international level. National and international appeals for the restoration of the properties. Attempts to negotiate.	Overlapping claims over property. Overlapping claims over believers --> state subsidy is proportional to the number of believers.
Orthodox Church *Clergy* *Believers*	Frustration with the Uniate identity and with the Uniate claims over property. Intransigent position over the Uniate issue – refusal to negotiate. Assumption that Uniate are "blinded" Orthodox that were "lured" by the "diabolical" Jesuit manipulation and forced into betraying their historical faith. The Other: Uniate Church and Vatican (Catholics).	Denial of rights for property, of the number of believers and denial of the Uniate identity as such. Refusal (direct or indirect) to negotiate.	Overlapping claims over property. Overlapping claims over believers (see above).
Romanian state (ruling elites, state bureaucracy)	Assumption that being Romanian means being Orthodox. Suggestion that Uniates are in fact Hungarians, and not Romanians. Frustration with the claims of Greek Catholics as they are shaking the perceived Romanian Orthodox identity. The Other: Uniate Church (depicted either as an anomaly from mainstream, or as Hungarians).	Tendency to "assimilate" the Other. Supporting Orthodox Church. Discrimination against Uniate.	Overlapping property claims. Overlapping ideological claims: what does it mean to be a true Romanian.
Justice system	Assumption that religious matters should not be solved in court. Assumption that the Orthodox Church has "the right" to solve the issue by itself. The Other: Uniate Church.	Refusal to address the matter within the justice system, which results in an indirect discrimination of the Uniate.	Overlapping property claims. Overlapping jurisdictions (religious matters should be solved by the Church, not by the Justice system).

Vatican (Catholic Church)	Frustration with the Orthodox refusal to acknowledge Uniate identity. Uniate seen as part of the Catholic flock. Underlying assumption that Catholic and Orthodox flocks are both Christian siblings.	Appeals to the Romanian government and to the Orthodox Church for negotiations. Advocating co-existence. Diplomacy.	Overlapping property claims.
NGOs	Respect for the principles of human and minority rights. Acting and speaking against mainstream/ majorities when human and minorities freedoms are at stake.	Advocating for minority rights. Public reports and statements presented through mass media on national and international levels.	Overlapping claims over freedom of religion.
Mainstream mass media	Assumption that "being Romanian" implies being Orthodox. Frustration with minority claims over majority based on the assumption that Romania is the state of Romanians (nation-state paradigm). This results in a generally stereotyped attitude towards any kind of minority. The Other: minorities (ethnic, sexual, religious etc.)	Looking for sensational by all means (focus on conflictual stories). One sided in favor of Orthodoxy.	Overlapping property claims. Overlapping ideological claims (Orthodoxy equated with "true Romanian")
Local actors (police, school, city hall, etc.)	Some local actors – equated Romanian with Orthodoxy and therefore see Uniate as the inside enemy. In some cases, these assumptions are translated into aggressive acts. Frustration with the refusal to give up identities that are different from the perceived Romanian identity. Some local actors – concern for minority rights.	Not a homogeneous behavior. Some local actors – discrimination. Instigation to aggressive responses to Uniate claims/ Aggressive responses. Some local actors - responsive.	Overlapping property claims. Ideological - prohibit exercise of faith.
International community (supranational organizations: COE, ECHR)	Recognition of religious minorities and of the right to exercise their faith. Peaceful co-existence and cooperative interaction of minority groups. Assumption is that there is discrimination of religious minorities in Romania.	Implementation of the international minorities framework. Ruling in cases brought to the ECHR. Issuing reports and recommendations, but no direct intervention in the internal affairs of a state.	Overlapping property claims.

Notes

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1 P. Beyne, "The Final Foucault and His Ethics", *Critical Inquiry*, vol. 20, no.1 (1993), p. 2

2 See Johan Galtung. *Peace by Peaceful Means. Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization.* PRIO, Sage Publications, 1996

3 Perspectives about the conversion may vary. The Library of Congress Country Studies accessible via World Wide Web states that the conversion was at many times done against the wishes of the believers and that in fact the Romanian Uniate clergy did not receive the same privileges as Catholic priests. (Information accessed last on 12.09.2002 at http://www.workmall.com/wfb2001/romania/romania_history_the_uniate_church.html)

4 According to Janice Broun. *Conscience and Captivity: Religion in Eastern Europe.* Washington DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1988, p. 202. By 1773, there were already 2,294 Uniate priests and approximately six hundred thousand believers [David B. Barett (ed.). *World Christian Encyclopedia*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, Romania, p. 367]

5 "Briefly, the substance of such a union was this: the Orthodox Church or community entering upon such a union retained its liturgical, disciplinary, spiritual and theological tradition (identical to that of Eastern Orthodoxy in general), while accepting full communion with the Roman Catholic Church." (Serge Keleher, "The Romanian Greek Catholic Church", *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1995)

6 John S. Micgiel, ed. *State and Nation Building in East Central Europe: Contemporary Perspectives.* New York: Institute on East Central Europe, Columbia University, 1996.

7 Without however assimilating the Uniate as a defining element of Romanian identity. Rather, the legitimation was rather contextual and served the recognition of the Uniate Church as a distinct identity by the Orthodox Church. The Romanian identity is essentially Orthodox, this playing towards the collective forgetting of the role of the Uniate - for instance, the Transylvanian School intelligentsia is not linked to the Uniate identity (enforced "collective amnesia" leads to collective forgetting).

8 The privilege of 1926 was granted to four Eastern Catholic bishops: the heads of the Roman Catholic Church, the Lutheran Church, the Reformed Church and the Unitarian Church. (Paul Mojez. *Religious Liberty in Eastern Europe and the USSR.* NY: Boulder, 1992, p. 313)

9 The Vishinski Plan provided for budgetary salaries for the clergy, liquidation of dissidents and infiltration of pro-soviet priests, restrictions on the religious activities of worship. (Robert Tobias. *Communist - Christian Encounter in East Europe*. Indianapolis: School of Religion Press, 1956, p. 317)

10 Earl E. Pope: "The Contemporary Religious Situation in Romania" in Dennis J. Dunn (ed.) *Religion and Communist Society*. Berkley: Berkley Slavic Specialties, 1983.

11 The Patriarch Justinian had close ties with Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej, as while chased by the Nazis, the latter was hidden and protected by Justinian. More than this, Dej was himself from an Orthodox family and his father was a priest. In his government, the Minister of Education and some other members were Orthodox. Justinian worked closely with Dej on the "re-education" of the clergy (see Robert Tobias, 1956, p. 325)

12 Robert Tobias, 1956, p. 327

13 Alan Scarfe states that 400 priests were executed. Regardless of their number, it is obvious that the Uniate clergy was severely affected and that cruelty in the treatment of the Uniate believers was hardly necessary. (Alan Scarfe, "The Romanian Orthodox Church" in Pedro Radamet (ed.) *Eastern Christianity and Politics in the 20th Century*. London: Duke University Press, vol I,

1988, pp. 208 - 232). According to the Religion Around the World website, "some 14,000 recalcitrant priests and 5,000 adherents were arrested, at least 200 believers were murdered during incarceration and many others died from disease and hunger." Source: Library of Congress Country Studies. (Information accessed last on 12/09/2002 at http://atheism.about.com/library/world/KZ/bl_RomaniaUniate.htm)

14 Janice Braun, 1998, p. 206. An attempt in 1956 to appeal for the restoration of the Uniate Church was buried under a new wave of persecution. In 1980, a clandestine Uniate committee appealed to the Madrid Conference of the CSCE for the restoration of their church with no success.

15 The Greek Catholics claim from the Romanian state: 2,000 parishes, 1,800 churches, cemeteries, chapels and presbyteries, 11 monasteries, 5 Episcopal residences, 3 theological seminars, 20 schools, 6 hospitals, 4 orphanages, 3 retreat houses.

16 The Greek Catholics were required to renounce everything that they had achieved since 1989 and to start everything from the beginning by setting up a mixed commission. (Dr. Vincent Cernea:"The Greek-Catholic Church: The current situation" in *Human Rights without Frontieres*, No. 3&4, 1996)

17 According to the coverage of the meeting by a journalist for *Romania Libera* daily, "the Orthodox part gained everything while loosing nothing, as the Greek-Catholics lost everything, while earning nothing." (29 October 1998)

18 Johan Galtung. *Peace by Peaceful Means. Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization.* PRIO, Sage Publications, 1996, pp. 70 - 80

19 Psychodynamic theories of human development see it as "confrontations between growing individual demands and the demands of the social role. They emphasize how the individual must accommodate to society while gratifying basic human drives." (p. 31) On this line of thinking, the work of Freud and more recently of Erik Erikson (1982) see personality developing "through a progressive resolution of conflicts between needs and social demands." (p.33) Also, in the theories of social-cognition, Selman & colleagues have argued that children develop through the relations with their peers, where conflict is essential in becoming aware of the "other", creating empathy skills and allowing the individual to positively relate himself to his peers. (Lois Hoffman, Scott Paris & Elizabeth Hall. *Developmental Psychology Today*. New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1994, 6th edition)

20 Galtung mentions that in Chinese, crisis has a double meaning of danger and opportunity.

21 Even if some communities may be isolated from the rest of the society (either self-imposed, as a result of a coercive act or due to geographical circumstances), total isolation is impossible to be conceived in today's world. Even if a community might manage to become fully self-sustainable, it will still be caught within the institutional setting of a state and thus forced into at least maintaining some form of relationship with these state structures. Even if this is done only on the level of the ruling elite, spillovers are likely to occur.

22 An individual may be a member of the community X, a mother, a lawyer, with a particular ethnic and religious identity, etc. In cases when communities are defined along ethnic or religious lines, some of the identities might overlap.

23 Galtung, 1996, p. 89

24 Galtung, 1996, p. 90

25 Structural constraints are those emerging from the institutional setting (legal framework, local organization of the community). Structural constraints are derived from the culture of that particular setting (culture being taken in its broadest form of norms, rules, rites, values, patterns etc.)